

ORIG: W. ELDER

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE 1 OF 7

UNIT: O/DCI

EXT: 7805

DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1962

TS-097

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ROUTING

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TO: [REDACTED]

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DCI 1-2

INFO: S/C 3-4

Document No. ....

No Change in Class. ☐☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS (S) C:

Next Review Date: .....

Auth.: HR 70-3

Date: 3-7-8-91

By: 233768

OUT 78480

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EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

FROM [REDACTED]

37228

1. HERewith CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
ESTIMATE APPROVED BY USIB ON 19 SEPTEMBER.

A. WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET UNION VALUES ITS POSITION  
IN CUBA PRIMARILY FOR THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED  
FROM IT, AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT  
MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA IS TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST REGIME  
THERE AGAINST WHAT THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS CONCEIVE TO BE A  
DANGER THAT THE US MAY ATTEMPT BY ONE MEANS OR ANOTHER TO  
OVERTHROW IT. THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY HOPE TO DETER ANY SUCH  
ATTEMPT BY ENHANCING CASTRO'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND BY  
THREATENING SOVIET MILITARY RETALIATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY  
EVIDENTLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OFFENSIVE  
MILITARY BASE IN CUBA MIGHT PROVOKE US MILITARY INTERVENTION AND  
THUS DEFEAT THEIR PRESENT PURPOSE.

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B. IN TERMS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, THE CURRENT SOVIET DELIVERIES ARE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVING AIR DEFENSE AND COASTAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN CUBA. THEIR POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THAT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF 11 SEPTEMBER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE REGARDED AS ENSURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE CASTRO REGIME IN POWER, WITH CONSEQUENT DISCOURAGEMENT TO THE OPPOSITION AT HOME AND IN EXILE. THE THREAT INHERENT IN THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS THAT, TO THE EXTENT THAT THE CASTRO REGIME THEREBY GAINS A SENSE OF SECURITY AT HOME, IT WILL BE EMBOLDENED TO BECOME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN FOMENTING REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA.

C. AS THE BUILDUP CONTINUES, THE SOVIET UNION MAY BE TEMPTED TO ESTABLISH IN CUBA, OTHER WEAPONS REPRESENTED TO BE DEFENSIVE IN PURPOSE, BUT OF A MORE "OFFENSIVE" CHARACTER: E.G., LIGHT BOMBERS, SUBMARINES, AND ADDITIONAL TYPES OF SHORT-RANGE SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. A DECISION TO PROVIDE SUCH WEAPONS

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WILL CONTINUE TO DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE SOVIET ESTIMATE AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD BE INTRODUCED WITHOUT PROVOKING A US MILITARY REACTION.

D. THE SOVIET UNION COULD DERIVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN CUBA, OR FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SOVIET SUBMARINE BASE THERE. AS BETWEEN THESE TWO, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB BASE COULD BE MORE LIKELY. EITHER DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET PRACTICE TO DATE AND WITH SOVIET POLICY AS WE PRESENTLY ESTIMATE IT. IT WOULD INDICATE A FAR GREATER WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF RISK IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS THAN THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISPLAYED THUS FAR, AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT POLICY IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OTHER AREAS AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

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E. THE LATIN AMERICAN REACTION WILL BE TO THE EVIDENCE OF AN INCREASED SOVIET COMMITMENT TO CUBA, RATHER THAN TO THE TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARY BUILDUP. MANY LATIN AMERICANS WILL FEAR AND RESENT A SOVIET MILITARY INTRUSION INTO THE HEMISPHERE, BUT WILL REGARD THE PROBLEM AS ONE TO BE MET BY THE US AND NOT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. WE ESTIMATE THE CHANCES ARE BETTER NOW THAN THEY WERE AT PUNTA DEL ESTE TO OBTAIN 2/3 OAS MAJORITY FOR SANCTIONS AND OTHER STEPS SHORT OF MILITARY ACTION AIMED AT CUBA. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ESTABLISHING AN "OFFENSIVE" BASE IN CUBA, MOST LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS WOULD EXPECT THE US TO ELIMINATE IT, BY WHATEVER MEANS WERE NECESSARY, BUT MANY OF THEM WOULD STILL SEEK TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT.

2. SITUATION IN ARGENTINA IS EXTREMELY TENSE. MILITARY REMAINS DIVIDED INTO TWO MAJOR CAMPS: A) SO-CALLED HARD-LINERS WHO TEND TO FAVOR OUTRIGHT MILITARY TAKEOVER TO NULLIFY

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PERONIST AND COMMUNIST INFLUENCE; B) SO-CALLED LEGALISTS WHO ARE WILLING TO RIDE ALONG WITH GUIDO GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. PRESENT CRISIS PRECIPITATED BY HARD-LINERS WHO SAW IN GUIDO'S ACTIONS OF DISSOLVING CONGRESS AND POSTPONING ELECTIONS UNTIL 1963 AN OPPORTUNITY TO CRACK DOWN ON LEGALISTS. HARD-LINERS TRIED TO OUST KEY GARRISON COMMANDERS WITH LEGALIST TIES AND LATTER DEFIED ORDERS. WE DO NOT CONSIDER CIVIL WAR LIKELY, BUT ARMED VIOLENCE COULD OCCUR WHICH BY INCREASING INSTABILITY WOULD OPEN DOOR FOR PERONIST AND COMMUNIST ACTION AGAINST GUIDO ON THE ONE HAND AND COULD MOVE HARD-LINERS TOWARD OPEN TAKEOVER ON OTHER HAND.

3. CONGO. PRELIMINARY TALKS ARE UNDERWAY IN ELISABETHVILLE ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING UNITED NATIONS PLAN TO INTEGRATE COUNTRY. PROGRESS TOWARD THIS GOAL WILL BE SLOW AT BEST AND TSHOMBE IS MAKING GREAT HUE AND CRY ABOUT ADOULA'S MOVES TO REINFORCE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MILITARY POSITION

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IN KATANGA AND KASAI PROVINCES. THERE HAVE BEEN MINOR CLASHES, BUT NOTHING ON A SCALE EVEN REMOTELY APPROACHING ALLEGATIONS BY SPOKESMEN ON BOTH SIDES.

4. DEATH OF IMAM OF YEMEN, EVIDENTLY FROM NATURAL CAUSES, SETS SCENE FOR DISPUTE OVER SUCCESSION BETWEEN CROWN PRINCE BADR AND PRINCE HASAN. BADR HAS DECLARED HIMSELF NEW IMAM AND HAS CALLED ON TRIBAL LEADERS FOR SUPPORT. BADR IS OPPOSED BY POWERFUL NORTHERN TRIBES WHO LEAN TOWARD HASAN WHO IS NOW IN NEW YORK AS HEAD OF YEMEN UNITED NATIONS DELEGATION. THERE ARE SOME PRO-NASIR ELEMENTS IN THE COUNTRY WHO MAY SEEK TO EXPLOIT INSTABILITY.

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
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5. ANOTHER NUCLEAR TEST AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA 19 SEPT  
ESTIMATED YIELD FIFTEEN MT.

END OF MESSAGE

  
LT. GEN. MARSHALL S. CARTER  
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